

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An analysis of current international events



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Economic Problems Dominate Hemisphere Conference

The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the fourth of which opened in Washington on March 26, is the newest instrument of the inter-American system.

The idea of an emergency family conference of the American republics whenever their peace or security is threatened was first adopted at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, held at Buenos Aires in December 1936. Two years later, at Lima, the specific form of a meeting of foreign ministers was decided on.

Emergency Conference

Three such conferences were held during World War II: the first in Panama on September 23, 1939, following the outbreak of war; the second at Havana in July 1940, to tackle problems raised by the Nazi occupation of Western Europe; and the third at Rio de Janeiro on January 15, 1942, just after Pearl Harbor. No meetings have been held since then. Their use, however, when problems arise "of an urgent nature and of common interest to the American States," was confirmed when the entire inter-American system was reorganized and streamlined at Bogota in 1948.

Last December the United States decided that "the aggressive policy of international communism" had created just the situation for which the consultative meetings were designed, and at Washington's request the present conference was called to mobilize the Americas against the threat of communism.

These consultative conferences are always emergency meetings, summoned for a specific purpose and with a strictly lim-

ited agenda. This one has only three items: political and military cooperation for the defense of the Americas; strengthening the internal security of the American republics; and emergency economic cooperation.

Economics Real Issue

It was apparent even before the conference met that the first two of these subjects presented no insuperable obstacles. The Latin American countries are strongly anti-Communist and wholeheartedly on the side of the United States in the present emergency. In this respect it is simply a question of arousing them to the urgency of the situation and persuading them to take a somewhat more active part in their own defense. Considerable military burden would be taken off the United States, for example, if the Latin Americans could and would man the bases and other strategic points in their own countries. The election of the Colombian delegate to head the committee dealing with this problem was a hopeful sign, since the choice was apparently influenced by the fact that Colombia is the only Latin American country which has made a sizeable military contribution to the Korean war.

As far as internal security is concerned, the main problem will be to tighten up security measures without at the same time putting a new instrument of repression in the hands of some of the less democratic governments. The United States, Bolivia, Ecuador and Uruguay jointly submitted a resolution which they hope will succeed in walking this tightrope.

The third committee, concerned with economic matters, has been the real battleground of the conference. The United

States would like to confine action and discussion as far as possible to immediate problems: economic mobilization; assurance of adequate supplies of raw materials; and so on. The Latin Americans want to go further. They remember World War II, when United States money did pour in, yet their economies were completely distorted to meet wartime needs. They remember that the United States bought vast quantities of their raw materials but was unable to send them in return the manufactured articles they cannot make for themselves. They complain that the prices paid to them were strictly regulated but the prices charged them were not. They saw postwar inflation chip away the value of the dollars they had accumulated. This time they want a guarantee that the goods and machinery they need will be available. They want to be sure price changes will not squeeze them. Above all, they do not want their long-range economic development to be sacrificed to the emergency needs of the United States.

A flood of economic resolutions went into the hopper. The Latin Americans are obviously not satisfied with what the United States offers. The United States does not feel it can offer more. Tough bargaining is in prospect if an acceptable compromise is to be worked out.

Argentina in the Wings

Not on the conference agenda but filling the air nevertheless is the question of Argentina. The eight-day wonder of Argentina's alleged atomic discovery is already largely forgotten. President Juan D. Peron's war on *La Prensa* is not.

On this matter some of the Latin Americans are as indignant privately as the

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North Americans. But they show no inclination to bring it up at this conference where, indeed, it has no place. The United States could only do so at the risk of raising the cry of interference in another country's domestic affairs, a battlecry to which most of the other Latin Americans would still rally, no matter how they might feel about the specific issue.

There is no indication that the unpleasantness between Argentina and the United States will have any direct effect on the

conference. The Argentines wander blandly through the conference corridors as if completely unaware they are international problem children. They stick to their position that the case of *La Prensa* is a strictly internal matter, unrelated in any way to the business of the conference or to their relations with other countries. They have, indeed, for the first few days at least, been unusually circumspect and cooperative and have shown none of the intransigence and anti-United States feeling they so

often exhibit at inter-American gatherings.

For the purpose of the conference, the United States is going along with them. There are signs, however, that in the future Washington's attitude toward Buenos Aires will be correct but increasingly cold. It would be difficult to go further than that without imminent risk of upsetting the whole inter-American applecart.

HARRY B. MURKLAND

(The first of two articles. Mr. Murkland, Latin American editor of *Newsweek*, has been attending the Western Hemisphere conference.)

'Co-Existence' Depends on Long-Term Readjustments

If the American and Russian negotiators, casting all diplomatic pretense aside, should express their innermost wish, it is entirely possible that each would sum it up right now in the phrase immortalized by Judy Holliday: "Do me a favor. Drop dead!"

But assuming that both Americans and Russians prefer survival to destruction, what can each realistically expect the other to do or abstain from doing?

What Can U.S. Expect?

Under the most favorable circumstances, the United States cannot expect the U.S.S.R. to "cease and desist" from being a great power in Europe and Asia. As former Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles points out in his timely book, *Seven Decisions that Shaped History*, some of Roosevelt's hindsight critics act on the fundamental misconception that it was within the capacity of the late President at Yalta to make or unmake Russia as a Pacific power—whereas the truth is that Russia had been a leading Pacific power "already for a century." If we decide to deal with Moscow on the basis of existing facts, not of wishful thinking, the United States could anticipate the following main developments in its relations with the U.S.S.R.

1. Because of its geographic position Russia, under any government and irrespective of ideology, will continue to have a direct concern with future events in Germany and Japan, in China and Korea, in the Balkans and the Middle East—more direct, indeed, than the United States which, even now when it has left isolation behind, is not physically part of the continents of Europe and Asia. This concern is justified by Moscow on grounds of security.

The United States, for its part, can legitimately insist that Russia should not imperil the security of other countries

either by military threat or attack or by Communist activities. In its resistance to the expansionism of Communist-ruled countries Washington will have the support of other nations, including Communist Yugoslavia as well as India, both of which have made clear their opposition to any kind of domination by great powers, whether the former Western colonial nations or Russia and China. But no matter what agreements the United States might reach with the U.S.S.R. through negotiations, world tensions will continue to exist unless internal conditions in many countries now vulnerable to communism are promptly and effectively alleviated. In short, the belief that Russia and communism are primarily responsible for many of the world's ills too often obscures, and sometimes postpones, decisions on long-range internal problems—such as population pressure in Japan, hunger in Spain, or unrest in Iran.

2. The United States will have worldwide sympathy for its insistence that the U.S.S.R. must not exploit the raw material resources of its neighbors. But we cannot expect Russia to be less interested than the United States or Britain in obtaining access to raw materials essential for modern economies, for example the oil of the Middle East. The United States itself has been criticized by some of our North Atlantic partners, as well as by the Latin American countries, for its attempts to stockpile strategic raw materials, sometimes to the detriment both of the producing nations and of industrial nations like Britain. There is now a growing demand for international allocation of available raw materials on an equitable basis at prices that would correspond more adequately than today to the rising prices of manufactured goods which the raw material producing countries must purchase here. Is it conceivable that all countries, whatever their political or economic sys-

tems, might eventually be included in such an allocation scheme? In an "open letter" to Stalin, Joseph Harsch of *The Christian Science Monitor* recently contended that the United States would not go to war against communism, only against Russian imperialism. Although this is true, there would still be scope for conflict. Would abstention by Russia from military moves and threats be followed by willingness on the part of the United States to give the U.S.S.R. a share, let us say, in Middle East oil or Ruhr steel? This is not an academic question, for in the past nations similar in ideology have nevertheless sought to exclude each other from raw material resources.

3. The United States can legitimately urge—and in this respect, too, it will have the support of other nations, including India and Yugoslavia—that the U.S.S.R. should abandon practices which violate Western concepts of justice and humanity. This demand, however, will carry greater weight in the rest of the world if the United States presses with comparable vigor for reforms in other totalitarian countries which, on the plea of anti-communism and even of devotion to religious beliefs, pursue some policies with respect to human freedoms similar to those we denounce on the part of Russia.

Practice and Theory

While we have every right to criticize Russian practices we regard as repugnant to our standards, should we assume that every development which has taken place in Russia since 1917—or more recently in Communist China—is erroneous and subject to condemnation? May we not have become as dogmatic in this respect as the Russians?

Here there arises the distinction between the constructive aims of theoretical communism and the disruptive tactics of the international Communist movement which

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India has been trying to define. This distinction, unconvincing to many Americans, is of great significance to the underdeveloped countries of Asia where some form of state control over national economies, more equitable apportionment of available resources and a drive against administrative corruption appear essential to economic improvement. In these countries many anti-Communists believe they can learn useful lessons from Marxist theories. Leading Western ex-Communists, understandably disillusioned with the Russian practice of communism, dispute this approach in Asia. The effectiveness of their arguments, however, is limited by the fact that, instead of offering a viable alternative to communism in terms applicable to Asian conditions, they appear to have arrived at a form of nihilism which is not calculated to fire the imagination of men and women living in stark misery and seeking to find a more satisfying way of life. Nor should we be misled into thinking that Asians, Europeans or Latin Americans who reject communism therefore automatically become fervent supporters of Western-type democracy.

4. The United States can legitimately express hope for an easing of political and economic restrictions within the U.S.S.R. Whether or not it is wise for this country

to engage in attempts at subverting the Soviet government is quite another question. As George F. Kennan stresses in the April *Foreign Affairs*, internal changes are seldom permanently effected in any country through the intervention of a foreign power. Nor is it realistic to assume that even with the overthrow of the Soviet government Russia would return to pre-Bolshevik institutions (or China to Chiang Kai-shek), or that fundamental changes in land ownership, the trend toward industrialization, the modernization of family life, or the separation of church and state, would be scrapped—any more than it has proved possible to scrap the changes brought about by the English, French and American Revolutions.

We are so close to the events of our times that we can discern eventual consequences only dimly. But may it not come to pass that neither communism on the Russian pattern nor democracy on the American pattern will inevitably prove the "wave of the future?" We may be about to arrive at a balance—not merely of military forces and strategic positions—but, more important, of ideological concepts. Both communism and Western liberalism, if shorn of imperialist designs, will play an important part in the shaping of society in the second half of this century—but the exact proportion in which the two will be

blended in any given country will depend on the historical development and actual circumstances of that country.

It is because the basic issues between Communists and non-Communists are in the realm of the intangible—of ideas, not merely of material things—that adjustments cannot be brought about by diplomatic conferences alone. Adjustments—assuming of course that a will to adjust exists on both sides—can be brought about only gradually, over a long, at present unpredictable, period of time, by the process of change to which all societies are subject, even those with totalitarian regimes. The United States cannot alone control this process of change, any more than can the U.S.S.R. What we can do is to exert such influence as we command to guide the process in the direction we deem to be desirable. Before we do this we might take a cue from the "quiet time" practice of the Quakers, and entrust some of our leading citizens with the task of quietly rethinking and redefining the aims of our own society as they relate to the world community. We might surprise ourselves by discovering that we have far more to offer to nations now in the throes of revolutionary upheaval than some of the more timorous among us have been willing to admit.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The second of two articles.)

U. S. Urged To Promote United Nations Philosophy

The necessary preoccupation today with military and industrial mobilization of the United Nations has tended to obscure the very great need for an intensive educational program to promote the United Nations ideology. Military demands are overwhelming, and the uncertainty as to where or even whether the new armed forces will be needed makes the task immensely more difficult than mobilization in a full state of war.

Yet the greater the demands of mobilization and the more uncertain the date for all-out action, the greater is the need for psychological preparation. The task would be much easier if the people of all the UN countries today were convinced that the central issue of the current crisis is the maintenance of the UN and that what is at stake is the whole international way of life achieved through the winning of World War II.

A Program of Education

The lack of this understanding has been often revealed in the "great debate" now going on in this country. The tendency

to despair of United Nations procedure and to fly off to some extreme or other of purely national action—whether to isolate ourselves in a great fortress or "to knock hell out of Russia now"—has been evidenced by the words of many speakers who would like to lead public opinion.

As its contribution to the "great debate," the Foreign Policy Association has invited distinguished leaders of differing opinions to offer their views on the course the United States should follow in world affairs. The eleventh article in the series appears in the adjoining columns.

In Europe one finds similar expressions of despair and evidence of failure to comprehend the true nature of the crisis. When the Korean war broke out there were many people in Europe who saw it as a remote skirmish, hardly affecting the peace of their continent. Their reaction

was like that of many Americans toward Italian, Japanese and German aggression in the 1930's. In other parts of the world, notably in Latin America, the Middle East and the Far East, people find it so difficult to see the relation between collective action and the daily struggle for food, for freedom and for life itself, that they feel little concern over the outcome.

One of the causes for public uncertainty and apathy is the lack of a positive educational program to provide people of the United Nations with the ideological foundation for collective action by the world community. Such an educational program should be under way in every member state of the United Nations through all available media. Intensively and systematically carried out, it can establish in the minds of the world's peoples a conviction about the United Nations so that all its efforts, including not only the military but the economic, health, agricultural and social welfare programs are seen as parts of a total world effort and receive full public support in all member states.

The scope and content of such an educational program is not hard to envisage. It should help people to see that war anywhere endangers the peace of all; that nations are interdependent for their economic welfare, and no people can long remain prosperous at the expense of others; that people are different and that these differences of culture must be tolerated within the limits of the UN membership obligations; that the United Nations system is indispensable to the people of the world community, both for the maintenance of peace and for the promotion of human welfare; and that lasting peace depends on recognition of basic human rights which cannot be sacrificed by the whims of dictators or irresponsible minorities.

Many people hoped that Unesco might promote this kind of educational program, but so far this organization has been largely concerned with educational, scientific and cultural activities that will enrich the peace if it is achieved by other means. Unesco's work could still be oriented toward this necessary educational task, but if it is not, other international means and institutions should be found, although of course the ultimate responsibility for action rests on the member states and the peoples of the United Nations.

The ideology of the United Nations is the ideology of free people, believing in the democratic process as regards government and politics; accepting the dignity of man, elaborated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as the foundation for a peaceful and prosperous society, and committed to human betterment through international collaboration for the preventing of war and the raising of economic and social standards.

What U.S. Can Do

It should be a major part of American foreign policy to persuade all member nations to participate in a worldwide educational campaign based on the United Nations ideology. We have already done much, not only at home but though the remarkable leadership displayed from the very beginning of the Korean crisis.

What is needed is a recognition that our leadership in promoting the United Na-

tions ideology is as important as our leadership in military and industrial matters—indeed, is necessary to prevent our industrial and military leadership from being misunderstood and suspected. The United States is in a peculiarly favorable position to assume this leadership, because the United Nations ideology is consistent with that part of our national tradition which most appeals to other peoples. Our history appears to many millions around the world as the record of a living faith in human potentialities and in the power of men to achieve in this world a better life. In the long effort of men to promote this end through the development of democratic institutions, the United Nations is but the latest stage. Its Charter embodies and builds on the best that has been achieved in the histories of its member states. In pressing vigorously for the acceptance of the United Nations ideology the United States will not only be true to its obligations as a member of the United Nations but will be continuing its historic role among the free people of the world.

WALTER H. C. LAVES

(Dr. Laves, at present visiting professor of political science at the University of Michigan, is former Deputy Director General of Unesco.)

Branch and Affiliate Meetings

BUFFALO, April 7, *Model UN Assembly*, Benjamin H. Brown

NEW YORK, April 7, *What Will Be Japan's Role in the World?* Student Forum

PHILADELPHIA, April 9, *U.S.: Democracy's Future*, Morris Wolf, David Heaps; *Is America Winning the Battle for Men's Minds?* Frances R. Fussell, Michael Harris; *Russian Aims and Our Chances for Peace*, Jeanne Singer, John Likas

BETHLEHEM, April 10, *The Philippines Emerge*, Maria Osmena

COLUMBUS, April 10, *Yugoslavia*, Alexander Dragnick

PHILADELPHIA, April 10, *Is America's Voice Being Heard and Understood?* Hertha Kraus, Emily Ehle

DETROIT, April 11, *Where Is Our Foreign Policy Leading Us In Europe?* Marshall Knappen

PHILADELPHIA, April 12, *The UN Today and Its Future*, Crystal Bird Fauset, Arthur Cook

PROVIDENCE, April 13, *Yugoslavia*

BUFFALO, April 14, *The Next Phase in U.S. Foreign Policy*, Vera M. Dean

SPRINGFIELD, April 14, *Workshop in International Conciliation*, Sir Alfred Zimmern, Hollis Peter

HARTFORD, April 16, *Britain's Military Effort in the Far East*, Brigadier Ian L. Wight

NEW ORLEANS, April 17, *Britain and Europe: Integration and Defense*, Andrew Shonfield

News in the Making

INDIA'S NEED—AMERICA'S OPPORTUNITY: As the House Rules Committee continued to hold up the India food bill providing famine relief of 2 million tons of surplus wheat, the Chinese Communist regime moved into the breach with a propagandistically potent offer to sell as much as 1 million tons of foodstuffs. Meanwhile, David E. Lilienthal, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, upon returning from a trip to India, warned on April 1 that the United States was repeating in India the mistakes which had paved the way for the triumph of communism in China.

SCHUMAN PLAN HITS SNAGS: No sooner had the six-nation accord on the Schuman plan been initialed than new obstacles to its implementation arose. The Saar, a former German territory now having a semi-independent status—although under French occupation pending the conclusion of a German peace treaty—has claimed the right to sign the Schuman plan accord independently of either France or Germany. The Free Democratic party, a participant in the Bonn coalition government, however, demands that West Germany, not France, represent the Saar in the Schuman plan.

BRITAIN'S BUDGET: Britain's financial year came to an end on March 31 with a net government over-all surplus of £247 million (\$692.6 million) of revenue over expenditure. The need for defense spending and restoring food and raw material stocks will probably prevent any easing of taxes when Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Gaitskell introduces his new budget on April 10. However, Britain's financial situation is favorable enough to make large new burdens unlikely.

ITALIAN DEFENSE: New political tensions in Italy may delay Premier Alcide de Gasperi's defense program. Giuseppe Saragat, right-wing Socialist leader, asked his party's congress on March 31 to withdraw its ministers from the coalition cabinet. If the Saragat Socialists step down, the Premier is expected to face a new confidence vote before the rearmament debate in the Senate is concluded.